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1 INTRODUCTION 
The Internet has been described as public battle ground were hegemonic perspectives frequently clash 
(Dahlberg, 2007). Against this agonistic understanding of cyber space, studies have investigated 
counter publics which try to promote their own narratives and political agendas online (Kaiser & 
Puschmann, 2017; Toepfl & Piwoni, 2018). While previous research has more and more focused on 
“disruptive forces” (Bennett & Pfetsch, 2018) such as conspiracy theorists or extremist groups, this 
paper adopts another perspective by focusing on civic forces which promote democratic norms in 
public discourses. The public promotion of democratic norms online has recently been introduced as 
Online Civic Intervention (OCI) – a form of user participation that aims to restore deliberative debate 
(Porten-Cheé et al., 2020). OCI so far, has adopted a micro-level perspective neglecting theoretical 
considerations for the meso- and macro-level. This paper wants to fill this gap by introducing the 
concepts of Collective Civic Engagement (CCE; meso-level) and Civic Counter Publics (CCP; 
macro-level).  
Both concepts originate from the observation that people speak up against the violation of democratic 
principles in online discussions which can be derived from deliberative theory (Friess & Eilders, 
2015). While these civic interventions are naturally performed by individuals, we have also seen the 
emergence of online activist groups such as the Iam-here-Network (Iam-here-network, 2020), Recon-
quista Internet (Garland et al., 2020), or the International Network against Cyber-Hate (INACH, 
2020). These groups envision to improve online discussions by promoting deliberative norms such 
as rationality, empathy, and civility. Group members are regular citizens who engage with some sense 
of common good orientation. Therefore, we characterize these activities as a form of civic engage-
ment (Adler & Goggin, 2005). In addition to that, these activity patterns resemble those investigated 
under the term of online collective action (Harlow & Harp, 2010). Thus, we investigate such behavior 
under the term Collective Civic Engagement (Friess, Ziegele & Hainbach, 2020).  
While collective civic engagement can be researched on the meso-level in terms of internal organi-
zation, social constitution, and group identity, it can also be considered a macro phenomenon shifting 
the focus towards public spheres. This macro perspective becomes accurate when we consider the 
outcomes of such group activities which is the overall quality of public online debates. In the follow-
ing we want to make some brief remarks on online publics before discussing the concepts of CCE 
and CCP in more detail. We conclude with some normative reflections.  
2 ONLINE PUBLICS - THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
Originating in political philosophy, public sphere conceptions have influenced a broad range of dif-
ferent disciplines including communication scholarship. Particularly, the rapid distribution of the in-
ternet has stimulated manifold theoretical reflections on online public spheres (e.g., Bennett & 
Pfetsch, 2018; Frieß, 2020; Papacharissi, 2002). Against the backdrop of its popularity and the plu-
rality of conceptions, the concept of the public sphere can be described as an “essentiality contested 
concept” (Rauchfleisch, 2017). Therefore, it is important to gain some degree of clarification. How-
ever, since an in-depth discussion of different public sphere conceptions is beyond the scope of this 
abstract (but see: Dahlberg, 2011; Ferree et al., 2002), we will proceed straightforward by proposing  
an idea how online publics can be described.  
 
According to Habermas (1974) the public sphere is a realm of social life where public opinion can be 
formed. This conception emphasizes the productive character of the public sphere which is not just a 
communicative space where different opinions are articulated (like in the liberal tradition), but rather 
mutually contested and discursively (trans)formed. At the end of this process something like public 
opinion may emerge, which ideally legitimates public policies (Habermas, 1996). This interpretation, 
however, puts a very strong focus on the generation of legitimacy that ultimately safeguards demo-
cratic policy making. Other authors have moved away from this intermediating understanding, stress-
ing the social and cultural aspects of public spheres. This goes hand in hand with the general acknowl-
edgment that there are rather multiple public spheres than one singular public (Asen, 2000; Fraser, 
1990, Poor, 2006). In this interpretation, a public is a communicative entity: “A public is a space of 
discourse organized by nothing other than discourse itself.” (Warner, 2002, p. 413). Warner also 
stresses the constitutional role of the audience without which no public can exist. Together, commu-
nication and an audience that gathers around some topic or issue provide necessary conditions to form 
a public.  
These patterns of publics seem easily adaptable for the online environment. An online public is con-
stituted in the moment when an audience gathers, more or less publicly, in order to discuss a topic or 
issue considered to be relevant for the participants (Frieß, 2020). Such publics can emerge in online 
forums, on news websites, or in comment sections attached to news articles on platforms such as 
Facebook or Twitter. Previous research has analyzed such publics in many respects. Especially, the 
analysis of the textual quality of online publics has received much attention. Thus, several studies 
have analyzed whether or under which circumstances online publics live up to norms of deliberation 
such as civility, rationality, and reciprocity, which are believed to be good indicators for a democratic 
public discourse (e.g., Esau, Friess & Eilders, 2017; Rowe, 2015; Ruiz et al., 2011). While delibera-
tion is also possible to accrue online, recent research suggests that incivility is a very present phe-
nomena in many online publics: controversial issues, such as migration, crime, or religion regularly 
attract high volumes of hateful and derogatory contributions and thus undermine democratic dis-
course (Coe, Kenski, Rains, 2014; Ziegele et al., 2018).  
Reflecting the increasing dominance of such sort of discourse, Davis (2021, p. 143) has outlined the 
idea of anti-public spheres, which he defines as online spaces of “socio-political interaction where 
discourse routinely and radically flouts the ethical and rational norms of democratic discourse.” Ac-
cording to him, such discourse is characterized by a lack of reasons, reflexivity, and rationality which 
makes it appealing for conspiracy theorists. It is further characterized by an antagonistic attitude as 
well as anti-elitist, anti-statist, and anti-cosmopolitan positions (Davis, 2021). It goes without saying 
that such anti-publics stand in stark contrast to deliberative ideals of the public sphere and the poten-
tial benefits associated with it.  
3 COLLECTIVE CIVIC ENGAGEMENT AND CIVIC COUNTER PUBLICS 
It is exactly this perceived dominance of anti-democratic online communication which has attracted 
scientific, political, and civil society’s attention in recent years. The emergence of concepts such as 
Online Civic Intervention (OCI), Collective Civic Engagement (CCE), and Civic Counter Publics 
(CCP)is a direct reaction to the factual increase of what Davis (2021) has called anti-publics in which 
norms of deliberation are radically flouted. All concepts are closely related. However, a distinction 
across these concepts seems desirable.  
 
According to Porten-Cheè et al. (2020, p. 515), Online Civic Intervention (OCI) is “a new form of 
user-based political participation in the digital sphere that aims to restore an accessible and reasoned 
public debate – a form of user participation that aims to restore deliberative debate.” Individua ls 
exercise OCI by reporting, flagging, or counterarguing toxic comments. Since they do so on an indi-
vidual bases, we consider OCI to be a micro-level phenomenon.1  
We have recently introduced the concept of Collective Civic Moderation (Friess et al., 2020), which 
we slightly adjust for the purpose of this abstract when we talk about Collective Civic Engagement 
(CCE). We define CCE as the systematic and concerted interventions by groups pursuing the shared 
goal of facilitating democratic discourse online. CCE aligns with established concepts such as collec-
tive action because it pursues a collective purpose (Postmes & Brunsting, 2002). It further relates to 
corrective action since CCE seeks to counteract the negative influences of certain online content that 
is perceived as harmful (Golan & Lim, 2016). Finally, it is a form of civic engagement because the 
group members engage as volunteers with a sense of common good orientation (Adler & Goggin, 
2005). Since CCE is performed by organized groups, we consider it to be a meso-level phenomenon.  
The concept of Civic Counter Publics (CCP) has not been introduced yet. We argue that CCE can 
contribute to CCP when it is able to set the tone back to civility. Nevertheless, proposing the idea of 
a civic counter public may seem counterintuitive since counter publics, by definition, need a hege-
monic public to counter. Attaching the attribute ‘civic’ indicates that the dominant public is somehow 
‘uncivic’. However, we have already mentioned that research suggests that incivility is a very present 
phenomenon in many online publics (Coe, Kenski, Rains, 2014; Davis, 2021; Ziegele et al., 2018). 
Thus, uncivil discourse can be considered to be hegemonic in some online publics that emerge around 
controversial issues such as migration, crime, or religion which also may be characterized to be anti-
publics (Davis, 2021). However, the theoretical idea of civic counter publics stands in contrast to 
previous thoughts on counter publics we briefly want to recapitulate.  
The academic writing on counter publics took off with the already mentioned assessment that a sin-
gular public sphere, like envisioned in Habermas’ (1989) early writings, is not suitable for plural 
societies (Fraser, 1990). Along these lines, Benhabib (1992) holds that “there may be as many publics 
as there are controversial debates about the validity of norms” (p. 105). This assumption, which also 
holds true for the internet, is no longer contested: “nearly all scholars of the public sphere agree that 
our social world is composed of multiple, overlapping, and unequal publics.” (Breese, 2011, p. 132)  
In this realm, Asen (2000) states that the original conception of counter publics discloses unequal 
power relations in modern societies. In fact, early writings almost exclusively focused on historically 
disadvantaged groups such as women, feminists, homosexuals, or black people (Fraser, 1990; Greg-
ory, 1995; Warner, 2002). Thus, the term counter publics has (always) been associated with social 
inequality and described the individual and collective efforts to create public spaces where both group 
related issues and identity can be freely discussed because there was no sufficient representation or 
space in the dominant ‘mainstream’ public (Breese, 2011; Fraser, 1990; Warner, 2002). While early 
counter pubic research has mainly focused on certain groups and communities, more recent research 
has shifted the focus towards issues and topics (e.g. climate change; or EU policy) where counter 
publics want to establish certain narratives and reframe meanings or interpretations of the issue under 
discussion (e.g. Kaiser, 2017; Toepfl & Piwoni, 2015). 
                                              
1 We limit the discussion of OCI in this abstract and refer to the original authors (Porten-Cheé et al., 2020).  
 
With regard to CCP, these points of reference change. It is no longer race, sexual orientation, or 
gender, nor the specific issues or a policy field that integrates a counter public but rather the mutual 
commitment to certain discursive values such as rationality, respect, empathy, and civility. While the 
violation of those norms in fact seems often go hand in hand with intolerance, racism, and homopho-
bia, it has to be very clear that CCP do not intend to discuss specific topics or issues but rather change 
the way how they are discussed. Thus, CCE engages on a macro-level by trying to influence the way 
how controversial issues are publicly discussed by setting the tone back to civility.  
4 CRITICAL NORMATIVE REFLECTIONS  
Conclusively, we want to sketch some normative reflections on CCE which ultimately are able to 
constitute CCP. Firstly, we should ask whether such movements exercise discursive exclusion. This 
problem has formerly been articulated by feminist authors (Fraser, 1990; Sanders, 1998; Young, 
2000) with regard to Habermas’ bourgeois public sphere conception. Drawing on Bourdieu’s idea of 
habitus, Fraser (1990) pointed out that certain groups in society who tend to speak in different man-
ners, may not meet the standards of rational discourses envisioned by Habermas and others. In this 
context, the capacity of rational-critical debate can be seen as ‘linguistic capital’ which is distributed 
unequally among participants in public discourses. Those who do not possess those linguistic skills 
are consequently excluded or silenced. In this vein, Asen (2000) has stated that the counter in counter 
publics can have manifold meanings. However, they all feed in some sort of exclusion from the 
broader public in terms of persons and topics but also speaking styles. The latter is of main interest 
here. However, we deliberately do not want to accuse activists to practice discursive exclusion but 
rather point to the thin line between exclusion and the legitimate effort to maintain a democratic  
discussion climate.  
Secondly, from a normative perspective, one may argue that while CCE aims to defend norms of 
deliberation, it may also violate some of them.2 This is best illustrated by the strategic background of 
CCE where members gather in secret groups and closed networks to coordinate their actions. This 
strategic element stands in stark contrast to Habermas’ (1984) ideal of communicative action. In ad-
dition to that, it goes without saying that a coordinated group exercises massive power in public online 
discussion, which again violates one of the core ideals of Habermas’ ideal speech situation. Conse-
quently, advocates of a free public sphere face the normative dilemma whether the ends justify the 
means: Is it normatively desirable to endorse a collective actor who engages in public discourse to 
foster deliberative norms? Or does this contradict the basic idea of deliberation where the only force 
in place should be the forceless force of the better argument?  
Finally, a related issue concerns the question of whether the interventions of CCE groups are related 
to a specific political ideology. Research has mostly investigated this question in the context of far-
right online activist groups which try to manipulate and bias public discourse by propagating their 
ideologies (Applebaum et al., 2017; Caiani & Wagemann, 2009). Much less is known about CCM 
groups. For example, it is unknown whether the engagement of groups such as #ichbinhier or Recon-
quista Internet only aim at promoting a specific form of expressing one’s thoughts (i.e., in a respectful, 
rational, and constructive way), or if the groups also pursue own political agendas.  
 
                                              
2 This paragraph draws mainly on a discussion already published by Friess et al. (2020, p. 16). 
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